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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
M I D W E S T R E A L T Y , a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
13874

CITY OF W E S T JORDAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This appeal involves the question of validity of
an alleged oral contract for the construction and installation of a sewer line by a developer, for the development of two subdivisions, with the City of West
Jordan, a municipality, absent the necessary legal requisites of the Utah statutes.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, sitting without a jury, wherein
1
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the lower court found for the plaintiff-respondent in
that defendant-appellant was liable to the plaintiff in
the sum of $20,134.35 on the basis of contract.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS*
On or about August 6, 1970, defendant, municipality, City of West Jordan, a city of third class, approved two (2) subdivisions namely, Western Hills 1
and Western Hills 2, on behalf of developer Midwest
Realty, plaintiff herein (Exhibits 2 and 3, Tr. p. 13,
line 29 to p. 14 line 16). Said plats showed the land
comprised of 34 acres, being subdivided into 167 lots,
varying in size from 6500 square feet to 7500 square
feet and were properly recorded pursuant to Utah law;
said 34 acres were purchased for the sum of $72,250.00
(Exhibit D-5). Upon the sale of the 167 lots plaintiff,
between the time it purchased the land on April 15,
1970 (Exhibit D-5) and it ultimately sold the land as
subdivided lots by about December, 1971, realized a
minimum net profit of $73,909.95. (Tr. p. 43, lines 12
to 15).
* For convenience purposes the parties herein shall be referred
to as follows: plaintiff for plaintiff-respondent, and defendant
for defendant-appellant. All references to pages are as to transcript referred to Tr. All exhibit references are in the same numerical order as admitted in lower court.
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There is evidence in the record alluding to the fact
that the developer was originally approved by the City
Planning and Zoning Commission for 158 lots and that
later the City Council approved 167 lots in consideration of the developer's expense in constructing and installing the main sewer line in question (Exhibit D-22).
The lots on said subdivisions were improved by
various owners and each lot was connected for water
and sewer service beginning with the first connection
on November 24, 1970, and the last connection being
made on September 29, 1972 (stipulated facts).
Beginning with the month of October, 1971, plaintiff by and through its authorized representatives demanded from the defendant City of West Jordan the
payment of monies for the construction and installation
of a main sewer line which connected and serviced the
two subdivisions (Tr. p. 81, line 16 to p. 82, line 8).
Plaintiff predicated its demands for payments upon an alleged oral agreement between itself and the
City of West Jordan wherein the city allegedly agreed
to repay the plaintiff-developer $1.50 per connection
per month for a period of 7 years, in order to defray
the cost of construction and installation of the sewer
main. Said payment was to made upon completion of
the connection of each lot to the municipal sewer
system.
Defendant refused to pay any monies to the plain-
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tiff and has not paid any money to the plaintiff. However, defendant had asked the plaintiff to increase the
diameter of the sewer pipe to be installed said size to
be ten inches (10") instead of the contemplated six
inches (6"), and pursuant thereto agreed to pay and
did pay the difference of the cost of the pipe to the
contractor in the sum of $2,584.
On November 17, 1970, the City of West Jordan
entered into its standard agreement with the developer
relating to construction and installation of the water
and sewer lines and connections thereto for both subdivisions Western Hills No. 1 and No. 2 (Exhibit P 25, Tr. pp. 86-87).
During the period between November 24, 1970,
the date of the first sewer connection, and September
29, 1972, the date of the last sewer connection, plaintiff
made repeated demands for payment of the City of
West Jordan, none of which was honored by the city.
On March 1, 1973, defendant City of West Jordan sent a letter to plaintiff advising it that the governing body of the city considered ". . . the payback
agreement in the amount of $20,134.35, for extension
of the sewer line . . ." and that the "council voted unanimously to reject this agreement as presented." (Exhibit P-20, Tr. p. 64.); attached thereto was an agreement prepared by the plaintiff and presented to the
council earlier the previous month. (Exhibit P-20).
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On or about May 17, 1970, plaintiff filed a Verified Claim with the City of West Jordan as a condition
precedent to filing suit pursuant to Utah law. (Exhibit P-21).
Thereupon on July 13, 1973, plaintiff filed its
complaint praying for relief upon the alternate theories
of (a) contract and (b) quantum meruit.
A trial was held on September 20, 1974, before
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, sitting without a
jury. On September 30, 1974, the court rendered its
memorandum decision and found ". . . that an agreement exists between the parties wherein the defendant
city agreed to pay back to plaintiff the cost of the sewer
installation and that plaintiff is entitled to its First
Cause of Action as prayed." It is from this decision
that defendant appeals and seeks a reversal thereof.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A S S U M I N G A R G U E N D O T H A T A CONTRACT E X I S T E D P L A I N T I F F IS B A R R E D
FROM RECOVERY BECAUSE IT F A I L E D
TO O B S E R V E T H E S T A T U T O R Y R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F T H E S T A T E O F U T A H AS
T H E Y R E L A T E TO M U N I C I P A L O B L I G A TIONS.
5
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A. The contract between plaintiff and the municipal corporation is void ah initio for failure to observe
the posting and/or publication of notice relating to
bidding.
It is elementary law that a contract can be valid
as against the municipality only if there is compliance
with state law governing the subject matter of the
particular contract. The Utah State Legislature described a method of contracting for the specific purpose of constructing public improvements when it enacted Section 10-7-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
wherein it states inter alia:
If the estimated cost of the proposed improvement shall exceed the amounts above mentioned,
[over $8,000.00 for third class cities] the city
or town shall . . . do so by contract let to the
lowest responsible bidder after publication of
notice at least twice in a newspaper of general
circulation printed and published in such city or
town at least five days prior to the opening of
bids; provided, that where no newspaper is
printed or published therein, such notice shall be
posted at least five days prior to the opening of
bids in at least five public places in the city or
town, the notice so posted for at least three days
. . . (emphasis added).
The Utah State Legislature specifically prescribed a
mode for the municipality to enter into contracts for
public improvements and an integral part of that method is the mandatoiy requirement of the publication or
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posting of notice. Plaintiff has failed to establish in its
evidence that there was any publication or posting of
the notice pursuant to the requisites of the statute. The
record only discloses that three bids were solicited by
plaintiff and presented to the city engineers but the
record is absolutely void of any reference or evidence
that there was compliance with the sine qua non of letting public contracts that of publication or posting of
notice.
The question then is what does the word "shall"
mean as is used in the statute. This court decided the
same issue in Herr v. Salt Lake County,
U 2d
,
525 P2d 728 (1974) wherein it held that the word
"shall" in a Salt Lake County Ordinance is mandatory and not advisory and therefore jurisdictional in
nature. In analyzing the issue the court said
The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily
that of command. It is defined in the American
Heritage Dictionary as follows: "2 . . . d. Compulsion, with the force of must, in statutes, deeds,
and other legal documents." The United States
Supreme Court distinquished between the words
may and shall in the case of Anderson v. Yungkaii, 329 U.S. 482 (1946) as follows:
The word "shall" is ordinarily "language
of command." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490,
493. And when the same rule uses both "may"
and "shall", the normal inference is that each
is used in its usual sense — the one act being
permissive, the other mandatory.
The County Commission did not act within
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seven days but took eleven days after the hearing
before it attempted to reverse the Planning
Commission. Did it thereby lose jurisdiction to
make its ruling? The trial court thought that
it did.
This court had a related problem before it in
Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d
305, 392 P . 2d (1964). Involved in that case
was an ordinance of Salt Lake County which
provided that an aggrieved party might appeal
from a ruling of the Planning Commission to
the Board of Adjustment within ninety days
after the decision. This court held that the
ninety-day period was jurisdictional, saying:
. . . The 90-day limitation of Sect. 17-27-16
is designed to assure speedy appeal to the
proper tribunal any grievance that a party
may have who is adversed by a decision of an
administrative agency. The evident purpose
of the statute is to assure the expeditious and
orderly development of a community, etc. . . .
Again the general rule is
That if a contract is within the corporate power
of a municipality but the contract is entered into
without observing mandatory legal requirements
specifically regulating the mode by which it is
to be exercised, there can be no recovery thereunder. If a statute . . . says that certain contracts must be let to the lowest bidder, or that
they must be made ordinance, or that they must
be writing, or the like, there is reason therefor
based on the idea of protecting the taxpayers,
the inhabitants, and the provisions are manda8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tory. If the contract is entered into or executed
in a different manner, the mere fact that the
municipality has received benefits does not make
the municipality liableJ either on the theory of
ratification, estoppel or implied contract . . .
As examples of invalid contracts upon which no
recovery has been allowed for the benefits actually received may be mentioned the following:
contracts not based on public bidding; contracts
not in writing; contracts not authorized by ordinances or resolution; contracts not authorized
by yea or nay vote of the council; contracts upon
which there was no vote of the council, where
such vote is necessary . . . (citations omitted;
emphasis supplied) McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 29.26.
The law in this jurisdiction is that if the requirements of the statute are not in substance complied with,
the contract is invalid and cannot be the basis of any
liability against the municipality even though the municipality has received any benefit of the contract. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 29.41.
The question of whether or not publication and
posting of the advertisement asking for bids for construction of public improvements is a necessary prerequisite is answered again by section 29.58 of McQuillin Municipal Corporations wherein it states:
An advertisement for bids must be published in
the manner and for the time required by law
. . . ordinarily a legally designated mode of publication is regarded as the measure of power, and

9
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material non observance will invalidate the contract and proceedings thereunder. Therefore, if
any particular mode of advertising for bids is
specified that mode must be substantially followed. Generally no publication is proper until
duly ordered, (emphasis added)
Further, discussing the matter of posting of n o f r ^
lating to advertising for bidding either in lieu of, as is
in this jurisdiction, or concurrent with publication, McQuillin states in section 29.59 the following:
If . . . posting notice is required, a failure to
post the notices invalidates subsequent proceedings, (citation omitted; emphasis supplied).
The weight of authority is consistent with the analysis
set forth and it is urged upon this court, consistently
with its prior decisions, to uphold the validity of the
requirement of publication and/or posting in examining
contracts for public improvements.
Furthermore, the statute states that the "town
shall do [let the bids] by contract," and the only reasonable interpretation one may place upon that language, especially in view of the public policy considerations involved, is that the "contract" must be in
writing.
The Utah State Legislature contemplated that the
contracts let pursuant to Section 10-7-20, Utah Code
Annotated (1953) as amended 1969, should be in writing if they are for the construction of public improve-

10
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mnets and if the dollar limitaton ($8,000.00) is met.
I t is clear that the legislature by enacting the foregoing section clearly established its intention to allow
municipalities to enter into contracts for public improvements but said contracts must be in writing, and
therefore, only those contracts which are in writing can
be valid and enforceable as against the municipality.
Such a requirement constitutes a mandatory condition
precedent and noncompliance therewith renders the contract unenforceable. The municipality can make a contract only in the method prescribed by the statute and
if not so made the contract is invalid and unenforceable.
The requirements as prescribed by the Utah statute setting forth the mode of contracting, to-wit, the
contract must be in writing, is considered mandatory
rather than merely directory and must be observed substantially.
In stating the law McQuillin says
Statutes requiring municipal contracts to be in
writing usually are construed to be mandatory,
and a strict compliance therewith is required to
bind a city. It has frequently been held that
performance, or partial performance will not
cure a failure to execute a written contract in
accordance with a statutory mandate.' Section
29.22 (citations omitted).
In Utah, in McDonald v. Price, 45 U 464, 146 P
550 (1915) this court stated that the statutory method
11
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of disposal of municipal property must be substantially
followed, or if the method prescribed is not observed
and followed, or the contract, whatever it may be, is
invalid. Accord: Collier, Inc. v. Paddock 37 Ariz. 194,
291 P 1000 (1930); Forrest City v. Orgill, 87 Ark. 389,
112 S W 891 (1908); Pasadena v. Estrin, 212 Cal. 231,
298 P 14 (1931); Durango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257,
7 P 14 (1885) and numerous other jurisdictions.
B. The contract between plaintiff and the municipal corporation is void because said contract was not
countersigned by City Recorder.
In addition Utah Law (Section 10-10-61, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953) requires that a municipal contract in order to be valid must be countersigned by
the City Recorder and if not so countersigned the contract is void ab initio in view of the mandatory language
of the statute. Specifically, the Uniform Municipal
Fiscal Procedures Act relating to the duties of the City
Recorder with respect to contracts provides as follows:
H e [City Recorder] shall countersign all contracts made on behalf of the city, and every contract made on behalf of the city or to which the
city is a party shall be void unless signed by the
recorder . . . (emphasis supplied) Section 10-1061, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
While this court has not ruled upon the application
of this statute, six other jurisdictions have ruled and
upheld the proposition that a municipal ^ont^n-t \« ;n.
12
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valid if it is not countersigned as provided by state statute or ordinance. In Council v. City of Dothay, 236
Ala. 166, 181 So 293 (1938) and in West Virginia Coal
Co. of Missouri v. City of St. Louis, 324 Mo. 968, 25
S.W. 2d 466 (1930), the Alabama and Missouri Supreme Courts, respectively upheld the rule of law that
since the signature of the clerk and/or the controller did
not appear as mandated by law those municipal contracts could not be enforced as against the municipal
corporations. Other jurisdictions holding similarly are:
Superior v. Horton, 63 F 357 (7th CCA, 1893) (comptroller's countersignature was essential to validity of
contract) ; Press Pub. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 207 Pa, 623,
57 A 75, (1904); Ellerbe % Co. v. Hudson, 1 Wis. 2d
148, 83 N W 2d 700 (1957) (countersignature by
comptroller is mandatory requirement of statute);
White Const. Co. v. Beloit, 178 Wis. 335, 190 N W 195
(1922); Lee v. Racine, 64 Wis. 231, 24 N W 33 (1885)
(no countersignature of comptroller, contract invalid).
Again the use of the word "shall" is mandatory
and according to the Herr case supra the same rationale
applies and therefore the contract is void.
C. Assuming arguendo that a contract existed
plaintiff is barred from recovery because it failed to
observe the requirements of Sections 63-30-13, and 107-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Assuming, without admitting, that plaintiff had
entered into a valid contract with the municipal corp-
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oration, the plaintiff is under a mandatory obligation
to observe the requirements of Section 63-30-13, Utah
Code Annotated (1953) wherein it states, inter alia:
A claim against a political subdivision shall be
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within ninety days after the cause of action arises
. . . (emphasis added)
This court had an opportunity to decide this question in a rather recent case in Baugh v. Logan City,
27 U 2d 291, 495 P2d 814 (1972) wherein the court
stated that an action on a contractual obligation is a
claim permitted under the Governmental Immunity
Act, but notice of such claim must be filed in accordance with Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated
(1953). In the Baugh case a claim based on contract
was made against the City of Logan for the exchange
of land owned by the plaintiff with land owned by the
municipal corporation. In upholding the need that a
claim must be filed with the city the court speaking
through Chief Justice Callister stated the following:
"Finally plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erred in its determination that Section 63-30-13
applies to a cause of action based on contract.
Section 63-30-13 provides:
A claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety days after the cause of action
arises,. . . [emphasis added].
Section 63-30-2 (5) provides:

14
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The word "claim" shall mean any claim
brought against a governmental entity or employees as permitted by this act; [emphasis added].
Section 63-30-5 provides:
Immunity from suit of all government entities
is waived as to any contractual obligation, [emphasis added].
Since an action on a contractual obligation is a
claim permitted under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, notice of such claim must be
filed in accordance with Section 63-30-13." 27
Utah 2d at 295.
1. This cause of action arose on or about November 24, 1970, or in the alternative on or about December 29,1972.
The lower court found that the "main sewer line
was completed in December ,1970, and that houses were
constructed on the 167 lots so that by December, 1971,
141 houses [connections] had been completed, connected to the sewer system and were paying monthly
service charges of $3.50 per month and thereafter the
remaining 26 lots were completed, connected to the
system and began paying the monthly service charge
of $3.50 per month by June 1, 1972." (Findings of
Fact, paragraph No. 7), and that ". . . the plaintiff on
May 17, 1973, did file a verified claim with the city
pursuant to the appropriate statutes." (Findings of

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fact, paragraph No. 9).
Further, according to plaintiff's testimony no payment was made by the city to the plaintiff during the
period of December, 1970 to May 17, 1973 inclusive,
and that no payment was ever made by the city to the
plaintiff pursuant to the alleged contract. Upon crossexamination plaintiff's witness Mr. Green testified as
follows:
Q. You testified that the subdivisions were completed ninety-five to ninety-five [sic] per cent
by October of 1971, is that true?
A. Yes, this is true.
Q. Okay. In December — in November of 1971
did you receive any payment from the city on a
payback agreement?
A. No, we didn't.
Q. In December did you receive any payment?
A. No.
Q. In January of '72 did you receive any
money?
A. No.
Q. Did you receive any money from the city on
a pay-back agreement up until now?
A. No. We have received nothing.
(Tr. p. 72, lines 7 to 20).
Further, the uncontroverted evidence shows that
the plaintiff did make its first demand for payment

16
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under the alleged payback agreement sometime in October, 1971, and many times thereafter as it is shown
from the following questions and answers:
Q. (By Mr. Colessides) Did Midwest Realty
other than the Verified Complaint that was filed
on May 17, 1973, make a demand upon the City
of West Jordan for a pay-back ?
A. Verbally, yes.
Q. When did they make that?
A. Several times. On several occasions.
Q. Would you state the first date they did that?
A. Boy, I don't recall to be honest with you.
Q. In October of '71 did you make a demand
for payment?
A. Yes.
Q. You did? In October of'71 you did?
A. I am not sure if it was exactly October but
by then we had made demand for payments.
Q. You made repeated demands for payment?
A. Yes.
Q. So can you — that's very important Mr.
Green. Would you say that in October of '71
with ninety-one percent of the subdivision completed you had made demand upon the City for
payment?
A. Yes. They should have started—started approximately sometime around there. After the
houses had been completed and the connections
were made, why, the payments should have
started. (Tr. p. 81, line 16 to p. 82, line 8).
17
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Assuming that the demand for payment satisfies
the statutory requirements of Section 63-30-13, Utah
Code Annotated (1953) plaintiff's claim must still be
barred by reason of Section 63-30-15 wherein it states
that
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute
an action in the district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances where
immunity from suit has been waived as in this
act provided. Said action must be commenced
within one year after denial or the denial period
as specified herein, (emphasis added).
Further as to what constitutes a denial of a claim by
a governmental entity the statute states that . . .
Within ninety days of filing of a claim the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall
act thereon and notify the claimant in writing
of its approval or denial. A claim shall be
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the
ninety-day period the governmental entity or
its insurance carrier has failed, to approve or
deny the claim, (emphasis added) Section 6330-i4, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
From the uncontroverted facts and the admissions of
the plaintiff as they appear on the record plaintiff
should have known that its claim was denied when first
made in October, 1971, or at the latest by the first day
of February, 1972, and within one (1) year from that
date, to-wit, February 1, 1973, according to the obligatory language of Section 63-30-15 plaintiff should have
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had commenced its lawsuit in order to be within the
statutes of limitation as herein referred to. Instead,
plaintiff did not institute the proceeding in lower court
until July 13, 1973, the date of the filing of plaintiff's
complaint in Third District Court.
There appears to be no controversy as to when this
action arose in that, assuming the facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and assuming, but not admitting, that plaintiff had a valid contract with the
municipality, plaintiff's obligations had been fulfilled,
according to its contention, and plaintiff had fully performed its acts by fully constructing the sewer line in
December, 1970, and the first connection for sewer
service, which would entitle plaintiff to payment was
made on November 24, 1970. (Tr. p. 84 line 18 to p.
85, line 5). At that point in time, defendant-City of
West Jordan was obligated to pay the plaintiff the
amount due for the connections made. It was incumbent upon plaintiff when it did not receive the monies
which it thought it had coming to pursue a course of
action prescribed by statute to collect the monies. Plaintiff did not do that until May 17, 1973, when it first
filed its verified claim.
Viewed differently, the last sewer connection was
made on September 29, 1972. (stipulated facts, Tr.
P . 84 line 18 to p. 85, line 9 ) ; again, in view of the
fact that plaintiff had not received any money on the
alleged payback agreement up until then, it should
have followed the dictates of Section 63-30-13, Utah
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Code Annotated (1953) and should have filed its claim
for payment within ninety days from September 29,
1972, which would have been, at the latest, the 30th
day of December, 1973. By failing to file its claim
within the allotted ninety-day period plaintiff's claim
" . . . shall be forever barred..."
2. Plaintiff's claim is also barred pursuant to Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
Plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery on the
basis and for the reason that it failed to give proper
notice to defendant, City of West Jordan, pursuant to
the following statute:
Every claim, other than claims above mentioned,
against any city or town must be presented,
properly itemized or described as to correctness
by the claimant or his agent, to the governing
body within one year after the last item of such
account or claim accrued . . . Section 10-7-77,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction that the presentation of a claim to the governing body within the
time fixed by law is a condition precedent to bringing
an action against a municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake
City, 33 U 222, 93 P . 570, (1908); Hurley v. Town of
Bingham, 63 U 589, 228 P 213 (1924).
Furthermore, Section 10-7-78, Utah Code Annotated (1953) states that
20
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It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any
action or proceeding against a city or town in
any court for the collection of any claim mentioned in Section 10-7-77, that such claims had
not been presented to the governing body of such
city or town in the manner and within the time
specified in section 10-7-77.
The necessity for presenting verified claims against a
municipality has already been decided by this court in
Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 U
370, 49 P . 2d 405 (1935) wherein this court held that
an action to recover monies expended to construct a
bridge which the city had agreed to construct is barred
and plaintiff is not entitled to recover because of its
failure to file a claim as required by Section 10-7-78,
Utah Code Annotated (1953); accord: Hurley v.
Town of Bingham, supra. Dahl v.. Salt Lake City 45
U 544, 147 P . 622 (1915) : Nelson v. Logan City, 103
U 356, 135 P . 2d 259 (1943); Peterson v. Salt Lake
City, 118 U 231, 221 P 2d 591 (1950).
In the case at bar plaintiff did not file its verified
claim until May 17, 1973, two (2) years and seven (7)
months from the date the last item of such claim accrued
if one were to consider that plaintiff's claim arose on
November 24, 1970, the date of first sewer residential
connection, or at the conclusion of the construction of
the sewer line by plaintiff which occurred sometime in
December of 1970.
Assuming that there was a valid contract between
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plaintiff and defendant, a fact not admitted herein, the
record clearly shows that while plaintiff might have had
a claim against this municipal corporation beginning
with the month of December, 1970, plaintiff did not
receive any money from the city despite its "repeated
demands", and plaintiff failed to present its claim pursuant to the dictates of the Utah statute.
Plaintiff has failed to produce a satisfactory or
plausible explanation as to why, while it did not receive any payment from the city despite its "repeated
demands", it did not undertake to file its claim until
May 17,1973.
D . A liability against a municipality can only be
asserted if there is compliance with Section 10-6-9, Utah
Code Annotated (1953).
This plaintiff in this action had sought and asserted
against the City of West Jordan a liability in the sum
of $20,134.35. As the record clearly demonstrates this
is a unilateral act by the plaintiff to impose a financial
obligation and liability against the defendant on the
basis of an alleged payback agreement. However, in
Utah the creation of a liability against a city or a town
can only be created pursuant to Section 10-6-9 of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Therein it states in pertinent parts:
The yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances and all propositions to
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create any liability against the city or town . . .
which shall be entered upon the journal of its
proceedings . . . (emphasis added).
This statute uses the mandatory language of "shall be
taken" and "shall be entered" in order to demonstrate
the method through which a municipal corporation may
be held liable financially. Such requirement constitutes
a mandatory condition precedent, and noncompliance
therewith renders the contract unenforceable. McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, Section 29.19. In Selby v.
Winfield, 255 111. App. 67, the Illinois Court held that
a contract which involves expenditure of public monies
can only be enforced as against a city if it is authorized
by recorded yea and nay vote. The weight of authority
in the majority of the United States jurisdictions is
that municipal contracts in order to be binding as
against the city or town must be a corporate action by
the legislative body duly assembled and must comply
with the requirements and requisites of the laws of the
state and the ordinances of the particular city. Outlining the procedures for municipal improvement contracts, McQuillin states the following:
Municipal contracts for public improvements
generally must be entered into in substantial accordance with statutes and chargers prescribing
procedures and forms. Illustratively, where a
contract for engineering services in connection
with a municipal improvement was not approved
by ordinance, as required by local law, the engineering firm could not recover against the city
on the contract or even in quantum meruit. Ac23
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cordingly, a party entering into an improvement
contract with a municipal corporation should
exercise scrupulous care that every governing
statute and charter provision is respected if he
intends to collect for his labors. Quite generally
the improvement contract must be made or approved by the governing body of the municipality. Again, where there was no resolution of intention signed by three-quarters of the council
it was held the contractor could not recover
against the city. In some municipalities certain
boards and commissions can effectively contract
for public works without the approval of the
governing body. Often the municipal contract
must be signed by a department head or the
chairman of the board initiating the works contract and where this is disregarded the contract
is not enforceable against the municipal corporation. Care must always be taken that the contract with the municipality is entered into by
parties authorized to bind the city. Statutes and
charters requiring contractors to furnish bonds
are mandatory and recovery has been denied
when this was overlooked. Customarily municipal improvement contracts must be in writing,
(citations omitted; emphasis added) McQuillin,
Municipal Corporation, Section 23.13
In Utah Section 10-6-5, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) provides that
• . . the mayor and city council of the third class
. . . shall be the legislative and governing bodies
of such cities and towns, and as such shall have,
exercise and discharge all of the rights, powers,
privileges and authority conferred by law upon
their respective cities, towns . . .
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In the performance of their duties and obligations pursuant to the statutory authority granting the same the
city council must comply with all the necessary requisites of the laws from which the council draws it powers
and must not deviate from any of the dictates thereof.
It is the general rule that the powers delegated to a
municipal corporation by the legislature of the state are
vested in the city council or governing body unless expressly delegated to some other officer or body and
further member of a municipal council may act only
as a group, and members cannot bind the municipal
corporation by acting separately and individually. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 27.07 at p.p.
234-235.
Plaintiff attempts to establish that a contract was
entered between itself and the city by Mr. Coates' testimony that he attended, sometime in August, 1970, a
special city council meeting (Tr. p. 19, lines 1 to 5)
and that the agreement was reached and made during
that special meeting. (Tr. p. 20, lines 7 to 18). However, upon examination of the evidence and the testimony of the city recorder the record discloses of no
minutes of any special meeting of the City Council during that period of time (Tr. p. 109, lines 1 to 24), and
plaintiff having that burden of proof, failed to produce
any minutes of the City Council that such meeting took
place, moreover, that an agreement to pay plaintiff
back was reached during said meeting.
It is elementary law that the city can only enter
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into agreements during a meeting, regular or special of
its governing body and that these agreements must be
recorded in the journal of its proceedings.
Generally the power to make contracts on be
half of a municipality rests in the council or
governing body, or, in case of a county, in the
board of county commissioners, supervisors, or
other governing authority of the county, which,
however, must act at a legal meeting and as a
board, since the individual members acting singly have no authority to bind the municipality.
It is well settled that the members of a common
council, board or committee cannot separately
and individually enter into a contract which will
bind the municipality, but they must act as a
body at a regular or special meeting of which
such notice shall have been given as required by
law. (Citations omitted; emphasis added) McQuillin, Section 29.15.
In the absence of any evidence that such a special
meeting took place the lower court has erred in its findings that the City Council had met in official meetings
and approved "by unanimous vote the payback agreement and that such finding is contrary to the evidence
in the case and contrary to the law in the State of Utah.
E . The alleged contract violates the Statute of
Fruads, Section 25-5-4 (1).
Plaintiff wishes to assert that there is a contract
between itself and the municipal corporation, totally,
however disregarding the dictates of Section 25-5-4 (1)
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Utah Code Annotated (1953) wherein it states that
In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum, is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
1. Every agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within one year from the making thereof, (emphasis added)
Plaintiff has failed to produce anv writm^ ™<>+o nmemorandum signed by any authorized official of the
city wherein the city had agreed to perform any obligations thereunder. Plaintiff merely relies on the
minutes of the city council which upon close examination do not reveal that any of the terms and conditions
of the alleged contract were either clear or definite in
the minds of the councilmen.
This court in deciding Adams v. Manning, 46 U
72, 148 P . 465 (1915), adhered to the rule that there
must be a sufficient memorandum in writing in order
to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds and further
in the Baugh case supra, it stated on note 4 quoting
from Williston on Contracts that "the preparation of
deeds or giving instruction for preparation will not
validate the contract, [citation]"
The lower court erred in finding that "The PayBack Agreement is specifically set forth in writing in
the various official Minutes of the City Council and
was approved by unanimous vote of said Council"
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(Finding No. 11) in that the minutes by themselves
cannot constitute an agreement under Utah law, nor
can it be inferred that the minutes are a memorandum
of the contract itself. In the Baugh case, supra, plaintiffs then had relied upon the minutes of the city council to satisfy the requirements of the Statutes of
Frauds. This court however upheld the trial court's
decision that the minutes were not a sufficient memorandum ; the court said:
They [plaintiffs] further asserted that their contract was removed from the Statute of Frauds
by part performance. In the alternative they
claimed that there was a sufficient memorandum
in writing to satisfy the statute. In response to
a request for a copy of the written agreement,
they stated:
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of
City Commissioners of Logan City dated May
27, 1969, contain the following written evidence
of a contract for exchange of property:

..,.'••

"A motion by Commissioner Bott and seconded by Commissioner Jacobsen to authorize
the Mayor to sign a quitclaim deed transferring
City Property in exchange for an easement of
13 feet from Fred Baugh for the purpose of constructing a sidewalk and widening the street
between main and first west street. Mr. Baugh
to remove the Tap Room building at his own expense and to relocate the canal to the original
canal bed and also the building of the new sidewalk."
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Based on the foregoing defendant moved for
summary judgment. The trial court issued a
memorandum decision which was incorporated
into the judgment in favor of defendant. The
trial court found that the claim was barred by
the Statute of Fraud, Section 25-5-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 (emphasis supplied). 27 U 2d
291,292-292.
There is one other case in Utah where this court ruled
on the question of admissibility of minutes of municipal
council meetings but that case only involved the narrow issue as to whether or not the minutes of the Richfield City Council were admissible as evidence and the
court held that in view of the fact that a statute required the keeping of the minutes said minutes were
competent evidence. Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v.
City of Richfield, 84 U 107, 34 P2d 945 (1934). Other
than the Baugh and Richfield cases, above, counsel for
appellant is unaware of any other case where this court
considered the import of the minutes of a meeting of
municipal council.
Ordinarily, oral agreements providing for payment
of money which are not or cannot be fully performed
within one year from the making thereof are within
the Statute of Frauds, 37 C J S 56c. Under the facts
of the instant case according to the contention of the
plaintiff the agreement was reached on or about August, 1970, and under plaintiff's understanding of the
contract the first payment due was on January 1,
1972 (Finding No. 13). That is clearly a contract
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which was not to be performed within one year from
the making and under the terms of the alleged contract
it was not to be fully performed for 7 years from the
making thereof.
There have been cases which held that a verbal
agreement for the payment of money by annual installments for a fixed period of years is within the statute;
See: Sturm v. Continental Oil Co., 131 Kan 518, 292
P 774 (1930). In addition agreements to pay money
in monthly installments have been held to be within the
statute; Maglaris v. Claude Neon Federal Co., 101 Ind.
App. 156, 198 N. E . 462 (1935); Thompson v. Ford,
145 Ten. 335, 236 S. W . 2 (1921); Vaudreuil Lumber
Co. v. Colbert, 220 Wis 267, 263 N. W. 637 (1935).
Also agreements to pay quarterly, Herman v. Gressel,
266 N Y S 263, 143 Misc. 775 (1933), and agreements
to pay semi-annually, Williamsburg City F. Ins. v.
Lichtenstein, 164 N Y S 345, 98 Misc. 342, affirmed
176 App. Div. 910 (1916), have been held to be within
the Statute of Frauds.
The finding of lower court that the minutes of the
city council is sufficient memoranda to constitute an
agreement between plaintiff and the municipal corporation is erroneous and cannot be sustained under the
evidence and in light of the record. All the minutes
of the council meetings submitted and accepted as evidence amply show that the parties were merely negotiating a payback agreement; from the first day that the
matter came to the attention of the council until a con-
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tract prepared and proposed by an agent of the plaintiff which was not even signed by the plaintiff, the
parties were talking and negotiating several alternative
approaches without ever arriving at a meeting of the
minds as to what an agreement may be.
In discussing the essential elements in considering
the validity of a municipaL contract McQuillin on
Municipal Corporations states the following:
The doctrine which seems to harmonize with our
governmental and legal system, which appears to
be supported by reason, and which, therefore,
should prevail may be thus stated briefly: If the
charter or the statute applicable requires certain
steps to be taken before making a contract, and
it is mandatory in terms, a contract not mfcide in
conformity therewith is invalid, and ordinarily
cannot be ratified, and usually there is no implied
liability for the reasonable value of the property
or services of which the municipality has had the
benefit. These provisions exist to protect the
citizens and taxpayers of the municipality from
unjust, ill considered, or extortionate contracts,
or those showing favoritism, and if the municipality is suffered to disregard them and the other
contracting party is, nevertheless, permitted to
recover for the property delivered or the services
rendered, either on the grounds of ratification,
estoppel or implied contract, then it follows that
the statute or charter provision can always be
evaded and set at naught. Cases holding the
contrary are usually based on the idea that it is
unjust for a municipality to receive and accept
the benefits of a contract and then defend an
action to recover the contract price or the rea31
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sonable value on the ground that the contract
was not entered into as provided by statute or
the charter, but it should be remembered that
the other contracting party is charged with notice
of the provisions of the statutes or charter in
regard to contracting and that the welfare and
protection of the taxpayers and residents of the
municipality are of more importance than the
dispensation of justice to a private party in a
particular case.
(citations omitted)
Section
29.02 p.p. 215-216.
It is urged upon this court that the better reasoning is that which is promulgated by this emminent authority on municipal corporations and the said reasoning
should be followed by this court in the facts of this case.

POINT II
T H E L O W E R COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN A D M I T T I N G ORAL
TESTIMONY VARYING T H E TERMS OF
T H E W R I T T E N S E W E R E X T E N S I O N CONTRACTS.
Plaintiff and defendant had entered into two agreements regarding the installation of the sewer (and
water) extension as it relates to the plaintiff's subdivisions. Those agreements are represented by Exhibits
p-25, collectively, containing the total understanding of
the parties as they relate to the subdivisions Western
Hills l a n d 2.
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Defendant's City Recorder testified as to the
meaning of those agreements and the procedure followed by the city with all developers in stating the
following:
Q. (By Mr. Colessides) Plaintiffs Exhibit
25 relating to water and sewer extensions. Does
that agreement contemplate and include the extension of the main trunk line?
A. It was my understanding that these agreements pertained to the extension of the sewer
from wherever the City sewer line ended to
where it would have to serve the various homes
on the subdivision.
Q. And is it always — the method of the City
in working these extension agreements they require every subdivider to enter into an extension
agreement to bring in from wherever the City's
line ends to wherever they want to develop ?
A. Yes. Not only to subdividers but anyone
that wants to extend the sewer line to a home.
(Tr. p. 91 line 30 to p. 91 line 12)
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : They signed this kind of
agreement to take it from wherever it is to bring
it to where they want to take it.
T H E C O U R T : Are you going to have her
testify that is the usual contract?
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : Yes, that is the way they
do business in West Jordan.
T H E C O U R T : Would that be your testimony?
T H E W I T N E S S : Yes.
(Tr. p. 92, line 1 to line 9).
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A. (By Mr. Colessides) Now, when we refer
to the extension agreements Mrs. Anderson,
twenty-five —
T H E C O U R T : Twenty-five?

I don't have it.

T H E W I T N E S S : They are right here.
MR. C O L E S S I D E S :
there.

Twenty-five

is over

Q. (By Mr. Colessides) Is every subdivider
in the City of West Jordan obligated to sign this
agreement?
A.

Yes.

(Tr. p. 121, line 27 to p. 122, line 4).
Other than the above testimony relating to those
contracts there is no other evidence in the record, either
disputing these contracts, contradicting them, or placing them in issue of fact otherwise. I t is the only
evidence which the lower court had before it and to
merely disregard the contracts in the absence of any
evidence which might sustain the plaintiff's position
is reversible error.
The court compounded its error by admitting oral
evidence relating to a perfectly unambiguous contract
in that it admitted into evidence the testimony by Mr.
Coates and Mr. Green in violation of the "parol evidence rule" despite the timely objection by the defendant. (Tr. p. 16, line 24 to p. 17, line 16.)
Furthermore, in view of the lower counrt's findings it appears that the motion by defendant's counsel
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to strike all oral testimony varying the terms of the
written contract which was taken under advisement by
the court (Tr. p. 87, line 23 to p. 90, line 18) was denied,
otherwise, the court could not have reached the findings that it made.
The lower court's findings No. 5 is totally inconsistent and contrary to the evidence in that the November 17, 1970, written agreement (Exhibit P . 25), was
the result and culmination of any and all negotiations
between the parties which took place in August, 1970.
Any negotiations by and between the parties which
resulted in that certain written agreement, Exhibit 25,
are inadmissible as evidence and the admissibility thereof is reversible error; all subsequent oral negotiations
varying the terms of the written agreement cannot be
held to modify the written agreement unless the modification was in writing.
In view of the lower court's findings one must
assume that it found that a new ageement was made
between plaintiff and defendant modifying the terms
of the written contract. But, to be effective,
"as a modification, the new agreement must
possess all the elements necessary to form a contract. A modification of a contract requires the
assent of both, or all, parties to the contract.
Mutual assent is as much a requisite element in
effecting a contractual modification as it is in the
initial creation of a contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d
935.
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In examining all the minutes of the city council
admitted into evidence it is clear that there was no
mutual assent by the city's governing body to modify
the terms of the November 17, 1970, written agreement.
I t is further stated that
The mental purpose of one of the parties to a
contract [plaintiff] cannot change its terms, nor
are indefinite expressions sufficient to establish a
binding agreement to change the formal requirements of a written contract . . . Mere negotiations between parties will not suffice to produce
a modification. Before that result can be accomplished, the negotiations must ripen into a mutual
valid, and enforceable agreement to modify the
old contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d 935.
Regarding Finding No. 8 of the lower court the
only part which is sustained by the evidence is that
which relates to the fact that the "minutes were kept
as the official records of the city in the offices of the
City of West Jordan under the care, custody and control of the City Recorder of the defendant, and said
minutes became the official records of the resolutions,
ordinances and other actions . . . undertaken by the
City of West Jordan." As to that finding the defendant stipulated and it now admits before this court. The
balance of finding No. 8 could not possibly be supported by the evidence in the record and additionally
by the fact that there were written agreements entered
into by the city (Exhibit 25) and that the city did not
rely upon the minutes of its council for its contractual
obligations.
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The finding of the lower court that "the pay-back
agreement is specifically set forth in writing in the
various official Minutes of the City Council and was
approved by unanimous vote of said Council" (Finding
No. 11) is not supported and cannot be sustained by
the evidence. Nowhere in all the minutes of the council
which were introduced into evidence does it show that a
vote let alone a unanimous vote was taken setting
forth a payback agreement. The minutes of the council discussed a possible payback agreement the terms
of which are not fully known to anyone including the
plaintiff itself.
The remaining of the court's finding No. 11 is
totally inconsistent and contrary to the lower court's
decision in that said finding is based upon a theory of
unjust enrichment and/or quantum mermit, a cause of
action sued upon by the plaintiff, but appeared to have
been dismissed by the lower court in its memorandum
decision to allow plaintiff to be entitled to this First
Cause of Action as prayed.
The finding in Findings No. 11 that the city received the benefits "accruing from the construction of
said line is totally inapposite of the facts as taken by
judicial notice of the lower court as it is shown from
the following colloquy between counsel for plaintiff and
defendant and the court.
MR. P R A T T : We are not seeking unjust enrichment for all the taxes you collected or anything like that. We built you a sewer line that
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you are not — you now own, use and receive benefits from.
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : Right. That's exactly
the point. We receive benefit from it. What
are the benefits? His testimony showed it was
the monthly — Mrs. Anderson testified that we
received three dollars and twenty-five cents every
month.
T H E C O U R T : Well, now, I can see your
point but I am not sure that that — oh, I am
sure they spend every penny of it running the
treatment plant and keeping the line serviced
and —
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : That's exactly the evidence I want to have before the Court, Your
Honor, unless the Court —
T H E C O U R T : I'll take judicial notice of that.
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : Unless the Court wishes
to take judicial notice which is fine.
T H E C O U R T : I don't think any of them make
any money.
(Tr. p. 106 line 1 to line 18.)
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action upon which the
lower court gave judgment is strictly a cause of action
based on a contractual theory and does not contemplate
the receiving of a benefit by the city, or the increased
valuation of the City's essets, nor the added real property tax values. These findings are totally inconsistent
with the judgment of the lower court, they are not supported or sustained by the evidence in the record and
therefore are erroneous.
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The lower court erred in its finding No. 10, to the
effect that the city through the collection of the monthly
service charges from the 167 connections ". . . has obtained adequate and legal financing for the payment
of said construction costs, and that in addition thereto
the city has other finances available for the payment
of said sewer construction costs. There simply does
not exist any evidence in the record tending to prove
any of the above or to sustain and support the same.
The lower court not only varied the terms of the
agreement by the parties as represented by Exhibit 25,
but in addition, it created a new contract between the
parties by sheer judicial force.
In conclusion defendant submits that the lower
court's judgment should be reversed and vacated on
the basis and for the reason that the court erred in
modifying the existing written contract and creating
a new one by interpreting oral evidence which should
have been stricken from the record.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILS
TO E S T A B L I S H T H A T T H E R E W A S A CONTRACT B E T W E E N P L A I N T I F F AND DEFENDANT.
The lower court erred in finding that there was a
valid and enforceable contract between plaintiff and
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the municipal corporation because the evidence when
viewed in their totality cannot sustain such a finding.
There is no question that the City of West Jordan
has a right given by the Utah State Legislature to
enter into contracts the same as any other corporation.
The right to contract is given by Section 10-7-1 wherein it states that
Cities and towns shall be bodies politic and corporate with perpetual succession.
They . . .
may . . . make contracts . . . for corporate
purposes. Section 10-7-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
The legislature did not set any specific guidelines
as to how contracts in general by the municipality may
be entered into and gave the power to the city to devise
the method and mode of entering into contract by
enacting Section 10-7-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
whereby the governing body by ordinance may choose
to exercise its power to contract.
In the instant case the City of West Jordan did
not enact any ordinance to describe methods of contracting, so one must look either to other stautory provisions enacted by the Utah State Legislature applicable to municipal contracts (see Point I) or other
existing law relating to the formation of contracts.
Generally, the requirements for the formation of
a contract are that there must be "sufficient consider-
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ation, clear and explicit words to express the agreement, and the assent of both contracting parties." 17
Am. Jur. 2d 345. In light of the above stated criteria
we must examine the evidence in the record and determine whether or not there was agreement.
Other than plaintiff's counsel's own assertions that
the City of West Jordan through the collection of $3.50
monthly sewer fee obtained the necessary legal financing
the record is void of any evidence supporting said contention. To the contrary the record is replete with
testimony by plaintiff's witnesses that without a sewer
plaintiff could not obtain financing from F H A to develop the subdivisions. Mr. Coates, who was one of the
originators of this development testified as follows:
Q. Isn't it true that the reason you wanted to
have the sewer in this subdivision is because
F.H.A. would not finance unsewered subdivisions ?
A.

That is correct.

Q. And the reason you put the subdivision —
you put the — the line from this point to this
point was to develop a subdivision?
A.

That is correct.

Q. Otherwise, F.H.A. would not give you the
money?
A.

That's correct.

(Tr. p. 26, lines 12 to 21).
And later on, plaintiff's General Manager, Mr.
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Green testified as follows:
Q. Well, let mje ask you this: Isn't it true that
F.H.A. required you to sewer this subdivision in
order for them to finance it?
A.

Yes.

Q. Otherwise they wouldn't have financed it
would they?
:/•:.••

A.

No.

Q. Without this sewer line they — without the
sewer they would not finance it would they?
A.

No.

Q. No, they would not. Now, let me ask you
another question. Isn't it true that with the
sewer line that property [34 acres] was improved
in value.
A.

Yes. This is true.

(Tr. p. 71, lines 11 to 23).
The only inferrence which can be made from the
above testimony is that the municipality did not receive
any consideration for the installation of the sewer line
and that the sewer line aided and assisted the financing
of the development and helped the plaintiff reap its
profits.
The other requirements necessary for the formation of contract are "clear and explicit words to express the agreement" and mutual assent. We have
searched the record for such clear and explicit words
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but we find none. The council in its public deliberations, as shown by the evidence of the minutes, is discussing a payback agreement as early as August 4,
1970, in reviewing a proposal by Mr. Coates. After
the presentation of the proposal by Mr. Coates "the
council decided to meet later tonight and go over the
sample agreement and consider the water and sewer
line extensions" (emphasis added; Exhibit P-4). At
that time plaintiff was proposing a payback of $2.00
per connection, per month for a total pay out over a
period of 5 years (Exhibit P-4). From that point on
plaintiff was unable to show that a public meeting subsequent to that of August 4, 1970, the council agreed
to a payback of $1.50 per connection, per month for
a total pay out over a period of 7 years. In addition,
the record does not disclose the time when said payments will begin and how said payments are to be made
that is whether they are going to be paid in monthly,
quarterly, semi-annual or annual payments.
From the evidence and in light of the various
amounts and the duration of time, discussed by the
council and plaintiff's representatives, it appears that
the parties did not arrive at a meeting of the minds so
as to from a binding contract.
It is respectfully urged upon this court that because the agreement complained of lacked the necessary
consideration, was vague and indefinite as to repayment
terms and lacked the mutual assent necessary, it is
invalid and unenforceable.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant submits that the case at bar represents
the classic case of the validity of a municipal contract
where justice must achieve the ultimate balance in
protecting the interests of the inhabitants of a municipality versus those who deal with a city and must be
aware of all the statutory requirements relating to
contracting with a city.
Above all this court should protect the residents of
the municipality because their interest is paramount to
the interest of a private party and therefore this Court
must issue its mandate to reverse the judgment of the
lower court.

Respectfully submitted,
NEMELKA & COLESSIDES
NICK J. COLESSIDES
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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